



Malta
Classics
Association

MELITA CLASSICA

Vol. 7
2021

*Journal of the
Malta Classics Association*

MELITA CLASSICA

Vol. 7
2021

*Journal of the
Malta Classics Association*

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing by the publisher.

Melita Classica

Vol. 7, 2021

Text © Malta Classics Association
Design and layout © Book Distributors Limited

ISBN: 978-9918-21-138-8

Malta Classics Association,

The Department of Classics and Archaeology,
Archaeology Farmhouse, Car park 6,
University of Malta, Msida

info@classicsmalta.org

www.classicsmalta.org

Friends in High (and Low) Places? The Allobroges and the Politics of Patronage and Provincial Society in the Late Roman Republic

*Ralph Moore*¹

The Allobroges, a subject people living in the province of Gallia Transalpina, played a variety of minor but significant roles in the political history of the later Roman Republic. From using the rite of *deditio in fidem* to play favourites between their prospective conquerors c.123-120BCE, through acting as potential recruits for and informants against the Catilinarian Conspiracy and intermittent rebels against Roman dominance, to becoming valuable allies of Caesar in his conquest of Gallia Comata and the Civil War against Pompey, the Allobroges were able to make their presence felt in the sphere of Roman politics. Though only seen in brief glimpses in the extant textual record, the experiences of the Allobroges in interacting with the Roman Republic and its political framework after their annexation make for a fascinating case study in the often enigmatic world of the provinces of the Republican period. This paper examines the surviving accounts of Roman-Allobrogan interactions across this period through the lens of Roman patron-client relations. In doing so, it will analyse how they, as a group, fit into the shifting web of conflicts and alliances of Roman politics and how their relationships with specific members or factions of the Roman elite structured their experiences of provincial administration.

Deditio in fidem was the formal, ritual act of surrender by which a conquered people made peace and transferred their sovereignty to a Roman commander in the field (acting in trust for the Senate and People).² Completion of the process engendered a situation wherein the new subject populace, at least theoretically and in some cases more meaningfully, functioned as clientes to their conqueror as patron. In pursuing a case study of how this relationship between a conquered people and their patron(s) in the Roman political elite functioned in practice, we can gain a better understanding of the often murky world of politics, agency, and imperial power dynamics in the provinces of the Roman Republic.

1 Ralph Moore is a doctoral candidate at Trinity College Dublin researching the impact of Roman Imperialism on class and social status in southern and eastern Gaul.

2 Burton (2016) 857–8.

The rite of *deditio in fidem* as part of Roman diplomatic and military practice in the Republican period is relatively well-attested but much debated in its significance. That the ritual process was consistent and well-established is evinced by the fact that the decidedly separate texts of Livy's account of its usage in the regnal period of Rome's history (Livy 1.38.1–2) and an inscription from Alcántara, Spain recording the surrender of the local Seanocenses people to proconsul L. Caesius in 104BCE (AE 1991,0965) are almost identical in their wording. What is contested, rather, is what precisely the act of surrender entailed regarding the legal status and expected relationship between the two parties, since the formula stressed both the abjection of the conquered to the will of the conqueror and the moral responsibilities of the conqueror to provide *fides* ('good faith/trust' and some cases 'protection/care') to the conquered.³ A key point to note, however, is that participation in *deditio in fidem* was not an absolute guarantor of positive treatment for the defeated, nor even necessarily of the protection it might theoretically provide.⁴ The relationship of *fides* did theoretically entail the creation of patron/client relations between the two parties, however, meaning that, while power was definitively unequal between the two parties, reciprocity was strongly encouraged and could provide a route towards benefit for the conquered.⁵

The Allobroges were a people from the south-east of Gaul. Their territory, so far as we can tell, extended from the eastern bank of the River Rhône (just south of its confluence with the Saône) up into what are now the French Alps (Strabo 4.1.4, Plin. HN 3.4.35).⁶ Though the earliest reference to them is found in Polybius (3.50.2), in the context of Hannibal's march towards the Alps in the late third century BCE, the majority of their appearances in the canon of Greek and Latin literature relate to a period from the late second century BCE through the turn of the millennium to the early first century CE.

The Allobroges were brought under Roman domination through their conquest c.121BCE. This came as part of a larger series of wars in southern Gaul. Some years prior war had broken out between Toutomotulos, leader of the Gallic Saluvii

3 Debate of the legal and moral frameworks that the *deditio* entailed are laid out effectively in the contrasting arguments of Burton (2009) and Eckstein (2009).

4 Incidents demonstrating the lack of legal protection provided to *dedictii* include the mass enslavement of surrendered Ligurians by M. Popilius Laenas in 173BCE (Livy 42.7.3–9.6) and the massacre of surrendered Lusitani by S. Sulpicius Galba in 150BCE (Livy *Ep.* 49 and App. *Ib.* 60). Burton (2009) 249. All primary source references taken from the Loeb Classical Library.

5 Barton, C.A. (2007) 251–2. For discussion of *fides* as a legal/rhetorical concept applied to relations with the Gauls, especially by Caesar, see Riggsby, (2006) 120.

6 Based on the subtle differences between the two authors' descriptions, it is surmised that Strabo's account cleaves closer to the pre-conquest, early provincial situation of Gaul while Pliny's accounts for the changes in local territorial organisation that occurred as a result of imperial reforms. Thollard (2009) 83.

confederation, and the Greek colonial city-state of Massalia (modern Marseille), prompting the latter to appeal to their allies, the Roman Republic, for aid (Livy Ep. 61). A series of campaigns c.125-4BCE undertaken by Roman consul C. Sextus Calvinus unseated Toutomotulus from his centre of power at Entremont and spared Massalia from further aggression, but Toutomotulus apparently fled into exile among the Allobroges to the north and began gathering resources for a bid to retake his kingdom (App. Emb. 12.1).⁷ Circa 123-2BCE, a conflict erupted between the Roman Republic and an alliance of Gallic peoples including the Allobroges, exiled Saluvian dissidents, and the wealthy and powerful Arverni of the Massif Central to the West. Sadly, most accounts of this war are only preserved in the epitomised sections of historians' work, though what little text we do possess speaks of a great battle at Vindalium (near the confluence of the rivers Rhône and Sorgue), claiming tens of thousands of casualties and netting its victor a Triumph (Flor. 37.3.2).⁸ Despite the fact that the majority of campaigning to secure the area had been undertaken by forces under pro-consul Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, the leaders of the Allobroges opted instead to perform the rite of *editio in fidem*, to sitting consul Quintus Fabius Maximus who had primarily been fighting against their allies the Arverni. This technical victory secured him the honorary cognomen 'Allobrogicus' and the establishment of patron-client relations between the Allobroges, himself, and his descendants for decades to come.⁹

The Allobroges' strategic choice to perform the ritual with, and thus secure the patronage of, Fabius over Ahenobarbus is not elucidated in any surviving text. A number of possible factors may offer a certain amount of explanation, including a certain amount of spite in ensuring that the kudos for their defeat went to someone other than the man who had crushed their forces at the Battle of Vindalium. Similarly, the choice of the sitting consul of 121BCE as patron could have provided a counterweight to the power of Ahenobarbus as proconsular governor of the emerging province through the two men's political rivalry.¹⁰ Ahenobarbus' control and influence over southern Gaul in the following years was not to be underestimated, and was best illustrated by the construction project of the *Via Domitia*, a road from the Alps to the Pyrenees providing a land route

7 Appian erroneously conflates the Arverni and Allobroges here, identifying Bituitos (elsewhere confirmed as a leader of the Arverni) as ruler of the later. Ebel, C. (1976) 71. Dyson (1985) 149–50.

8 One suggested location for the Battle of Vindalium is the hill-fort of Mourre-de-Sève 10km north-east of Avignon. Rivet (1988) 41. On the political capital that Fabius Maximus extracted from his victory and its manifestations see Dyson (1985) 153–4.

9 Deniaux (2006) 401–11.

10 The precise date of the creation of *Gallia Transalpina* as a formal territorial province is uncertain and subject to ongoing debate, see Kirbihar (2009) 31. For the rivalry of Fabius Maximus and Domitius Ahenobarbus over the conflict see Ebel (1976) 70–2.

between Italy and Roman-occupied lands in the Iberian Peninsula.¹¹ This activity was concentrated in lands south of Allobrogan territory, however, and would not have impinged as directly upon them as upon their counterparts closer to the coast. Furthermore, while unable to secure patronage over the Allobroges, the Domitii Ahenobarbi's connections in Gaul, likely including patronage of both locals and Italian merchants active in the area, later allowed them to become dominant players in the high-volume, lucrative Arvernian wine trade.¹² However strategic the choice of Fabius Maximus as patron may have appeared in 121BCE, though, the patronage of the gens Fabia proved to be a mixed blessing for the Allobroges over the next few decades.

In 69BCE, a young Cicero defended Marcus Fonteius against charges of extortion and corruption of office under the *lex Cornelia de Repetundis* in his capacity as *propraetorian* governor of *Gallia Transalpina* c.73-1BCE.¹³ These charges were brought against him by a coalition of Gallic peregrini, seemingly chief amongst them a contingent of Allobroges headed by their *dux* Indutiomarus. Though a clear record of the prosecution's case does not survive, from Cicero's rebuttals, it appears to have focussed on the governor's demands for money and appropriation of land in Allobrogan territory. His actions were justified, the defence argued, on the basis that rather than feathering his own nest, the money raised by Fonteius was to pay the auxiliary troops he had levied from the region, sent to aid the war effort in Spain under Pompey the Great at the time, while the land had been lawfully confiscated from local rebels and troublemakers to be rendered *ager Romanus*, as was traditional protocol (Cic. Font. 6.14).¹⁴ The problem, essentially, was that, as a governor imbued with *imperium*, Fonteius was entirely within his rights to bleed a province dry so long as it was seen to be for the benefit of the Roman state rather than for himself alone, and as long as he did not violate the rights of Roman citizens in the process (Cic. Font. 5.12).¹⁵ Here we see

11 Ebel (1976) 82.

12 Fentress (2019) 152–4.

13 Lintott (2008) 101–3.

14 For gubernatorial predation in Republican *Gallia Transalpina* see Barrandon, and Hurlet (2009) 66. For possible archaeological evidence of intermittent violence and changes in land usage in the area at the time see Mauné (2000), 240–1. For a comparative view of land expropriation from the communities of *Gallia Cisalpina* following the Roman conquest of the late third and early second centuries and their role in shaping future Roman policy see Roselaar (2010) 52–4, and Rosenstein (2012) 201–2.

15 In this aspect it compared with the most famous of Cicero's early career, that against Verres, whose arguments for the prosecution rested on the twin points that the corrupt former governor of Sicily had violated the rights of Roman citizens in his rapacity and had pursued his financial abuses for his own enrichment rather than the aid of the Roman treasury or fellow public officials. For more on provincial tax-farming and its potential economic impact see Hopkins (1980) 102–3.

the issue that while engagement in *deditio in fidem* might theoretically protect the defeated from the worst excesses of a Roman army actively on campaign against them, it offered no aid to the *dedictii* from abuses at the hands of Roman government during peacetime. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, in addition to governmental demands on their resources, the Allobroges and other Gauls were plagued by a rash of predatory, usurious loan agreements with Roman merchants (or *negotiatores*) active in the province.¹⁶ In terms of what became of expropriated Gallic land in Roman hands, another of Cicero's early trials, that of Quinctius, suggests that a relatively common fate was for it to be purchased by adventurous mid-ranking Roman citizens for use as profitable *pecuariae* ('cattle ranches' Cic. Quinct. 3.12 and 6.28).¹⁷ What is notable for our purposes in this incident is that despite being a seemingly high-profile senatorial trial in which the Allobroges as a conquered nation are deeply implicated, a Fabian patron to defend their interests is nowhere to be found. The case of the prosecution is instead argued by the otherwise obscure Marcus Plaetorius. Though the record is partially fragmented, we can reasonably assume that, as a recorded Ciceronian oration, albeit an early one, this is a case that Plaetorius lost and the Allobrogan witnesses he called went home disappointed.

The Allobroges make their next appearance in an episode far more crucial to the politics of the Republic, as players in the drama of the Second Catilinarian Conspiracy in 63BCE. Sallust's account of the events emphasises that, as the conspirators were gathering their forces for a planned coup, envoys from the Allobroges were in Rome, pleading to the Senate for relief from the oppressive burden of debt placed on them by a combination of provincial taxes and the frequently exploitative practices of Italian *negotiatores* and their senatorial backers (Sall. Cat. 40.1–2). The conspirators and Gauls had much to offer each other in a partnership. On the one hand, Catilina and his adherents had made debt cancellation a core plank of their appeal for followers, as the burden of loans weighed heavily on many in the Roman world, and was thus a central goal for their seizure of power (Sall. Cat. 39–40, Cic. Cat. 18–20). On the other, the military support of the famed Allobrogan cavalry would provide an effective complement to

16 Cicero's claim that no transactions occur in the province without the involvement of Roman citizens is clearly rhetorical exaggeration but must contain a grain of truth. For more information on loans and their mechanics in the Late Republic see Von Reden (2012) 280 and Blösel (2016) 79. For archaeological evidence of Italian mercantile activity in the province see Fitzpatrick (1985) 316. For broader discussion of *negotiatores* in Late Republican Roman society see D'Arms (1986) 24–30.

17 The case covers a dispute over Publius Quinctius' rights to sell the estate after inheriting it from his deceased brother, Gaius, against claims from his brother's former business partner Naevius (*Quinct.* 4.14–16).

Catilina's infantry-based forces in Etruria, predominantly composed of disgruntled, impoverished legionary veterans (Cic. Cat. 3.9).¹⁸

Despite their apparent desperation, however, the Allobroges were not about to throw caution to the wind. Sallust, bucking many stereotypes applied to Gauls in Latin literature of the time, describes the envoys deliberating over their options before committing themselves to the alliance, weighing the possibility of liberation from their burden of 'alienum' ('debt') and the glory of defeating Rome in war with the attendant dangers of betraying their treaty with the Republic, with the latter concerns ultimately winning out (Sall. Cat. 41.1–4).¹⁹ After making contact with Cicero (consul in 63BCE), the envoys proved invaluable to the exposing of the conspiracy, acting as witnesses to an oath sworn amongst the conspirators regarding their aims and leading a delegation bearing a letter to Catilina detailing plans for the coup into an ambush (Sall. Cat. 44.1–46.3).²⁰ In contrast with the trial of Fonteius, a Fabian patron of the Allobroges makes his appearance here, willing and able to meet certain obligations to his clients. Quintus Fabius Sanga, in his patronal capacity, played host to the envoys at his home, acted as confidant in their disclosure of the conspirators' plot, and safely passed the information on to Cicero and his agents. Cicero's own account of events, or rather his presentation of them to the senate in his third Catilinarian Oration does credit the Allobrogan envoys with providing the information necessary to expose the attempted coup before it could begin, but is otherwise hostile in posture, even using the menacing image of the Gauls to illustrate the threat to the Republic posed by the proposed (albeit rejected) alliance (Cic. Cat. 3.22).

Although they had just rendered the Republic which ruthlessly dominated them a great service, at not inconsequential personal risk to the individuals involved, any overtures from the Allobroges to improve their lot appear to have fallen on deaf, or at least ungrateful, ears. A year or two later, a revolt broke out in Allobrogan territory under the leadership of a man named Catugnatos. Due to the characteristically fragmentary historical record, the motivations and aims of the uprising are unreported and difficult to reconstruct with any confidence. The reasonable assumption has tended to be that the ongoing debt crisis had gone too long unalleviated and pushed the locals into desperate action. The resulting

18 So renowned was their prowess in battle that the historian even suggests that the Gauls had come to surpass the Romans in "*gloria belli*" ('glory of war') at the time. Sall. Cat. 43.3–4. Strabo similarly praises the effectiveness of Gallic horsemen particularly. Strab. 4.4.2.

19 Regarding stereotypes, Sallust here subverts Caesar's emphasis on rashness as a core trait of the Gallic national character (BG 6.20), a point later indulged in to varying degrees by Tacitus (Ann. 3.40–46) and Strabo (4.4.2). For discussion on Caesar's use of 'rashness' as a rhetorical trope in his writings see Dimitrova (2018) 40.

20 For further discussion on the role of the Allobrogan ambassadors in unmasking the conspiracy see Pagán (2004) 48.

conflict came to a head at the Battle of Solonium (the location of which remains a matter of debate in archaeological circles), in which Catagnatos' rebellion was put down by the proconsular governor G. Pomptinus, and the area was likely subject to a renewed round of reprisals and land confiscations, worsening rather than ameliorating the problems besetting the Allobroges as provincial subjects (Dio Cass. 38.47–8).²¹ Although no full accounts of the event itself survive references made to it in other works suggest that its impact upon the Roman political climate of the time was not inconsiderable.²²

An issue we see here is that, in spite of its implied reciprocity, patronage entailed by *deditio in fidem* did not guarantee a patron's support at all times or against all obstacles, while the shifting tides of senatorial politics and aristocratic family fortunes meant that the amount of influence a patron could wield varied significantly. Quintus Fabius Sanga, it must be noted, is only securely identified in his one appearance in extant texts, and thus does not appear to have led a noteworthy or successful career. For comparison, Allobrogicus' grandson, similarly named Quintus Fabius Maximus, would eventually secure himself a consulship in 45BCE, but his career in the senate does not appear to have begun in earnest until 57 (CIL 12.2,762–3).²³ The Allobroges' patron during their tribulations could give them some succour when obliged to, but, without the *dignitas* of high office and/or the support of an influential faction, his advocacy was of limited, if any, use in improving their political situation.

Though the Fabii were, by ancestral right, the patrons of the Allobroges as a group, certain families within the nation were able to secure patronage, and its attendant benefits, from other sources within the Roman elite of the Late Republic. Gaius Valerius Flaccus, whose consulship in 80BCE appears to have been followed by a stint as governor of Gallia Transalpina in the early 70s, was a seemingly prolific patron and sponsor of enfranchisement to Roman citizenship among the peoples of southern Gaul.²⁴ The legacy of his largesse can be seen in the several emergent dynasties of Valerii amongst the elite of the province, some members of which we will discuss in a moment. While the individual circumstances under which Gallic elites were granted citizenship through his sponsoring are unknown, the most likely case would be that it was as reward to leaders of auxiliary regiments he employed while in office for their service. For a clearer example of this trend we can observe the epitomes of the historian Pompeius Trogus, recounting that the original author was a member of the Vocontii nation, neighbours of the

21 Drinkwater (1983) 7–8.

22 References and allusions to the revolt are found in Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 13.32 and Caes. *BG* 1.6 and 7.64.

23 Broughton (1951) 201.

24 Christol (2015) 157–8.

Allobroges in south-eastern Gaul, whose grandfather had been enfranchised by Pompey Magnus in return for military services (Just. Epit. 43.5.11). While the exact nature of auxiliary service in the early first century Roman army is uncertain (due to limited evidence), in the case of Gaul particularly the situation appears to have primarily revolved around Roman commanders drafting in local members of the warrior aristocracy to bring their personal retinues to serve with them.²⁵ Rewarding such warrior nobles cum auxiliary officers with Roman citizenship would firstly help such service be seen as a profitable honour rather than an imposition (encouraging others to participate willingly) and perhaps establish networks of patronage, in which enfranchised leaders would provide troops on future occasions to the patron's allies. The fact that there appear to have been no *Fontei* emerging in southern Gaul, despite the large numbers of levied troops from the region, might further illustrate the dysfunctionality of *Fontei*'s tenure as governor in its lack of expected reciprocity of services.

Noteworthy, although there were was at least one member of the *Valerii*, later identified as Gaius Valerius Caburus, among the Allobrogan elite during the era of *Fontei*'s trial and the Catilinarian Conspiracy, neither he nor his sponsor appear to have played any role in them. It is instead the seemingly unenfranchised *Indutiomarus*, whom Cicero wastes no time in caricaturing as the worst kind of ignorant, impious, thuggish barbarian (Cic. Font. 12.28), who acts as the chief witness to the abuses suffered by his people in 69BCE.²⁶ As citizens, Caburus and his family would have been exempt from many of the impositions placed on peregrini by the governorate, but unless we can imagine that they were indifferent to the suffering of their peers for whatever reason, the suggestion would appear to be that they enjoyed sufficient standing neither within provincial nor metropolitan Roman society to meaningfully affect the situation. The *Valerii*'s apparent absence from narratives of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, a time when the Allobroges needed advocates and powerbrokers in Rome more than ever, further suggests that being an enfranchised citizen of provincial extraction, even one of high standing in one's own nation, with a patron at Rome did not necessarily translate into the ability to advance or even protect the interests of one's non-citizen people in the face of Roman dominance and exploitation. An important factor in this apparent disconnect may have been an issue with Allobrogan political structures themselves. In contrast with many other foreign regimes with whom the Roman political elite established patron/client relations in the second and first centuries BCE, the Allobroges (as was the case with seemingly the majority of Late Iron Age

25 Rawlings (2009) 183. Hostein (2010) 64.

26 Further attacks on the Gauls and their perceived lack of civilised virtues in general can be found at Font. 19–20.43–4. For discussions of ethnic stereotyping and its role in Ciceronian oratory see Vasaly (1993) 191–2.

Gallic polities) were ruled by a confederal oligarchy, with power shared between multiple elites, rather than a monarchy.²⁷ The enfranchisement of one or two members of the Allobrogan aristocracy would not necessarily sway the political system in its entirety one way or another with regard to support for either Roman policies or particular Roman politicians. Nor could patronising elites possessed of great influence at any one time necessarily guarantee future stability, as the tides of favour could shift among the Gauls as much as at Rome itself. Political patronage thus tended towards a more atomised aspect of Roman-Allobrogan relations, with individual figures and factions forming connections with one another rather than shifting the standing of the two polities as wholes.

The Allobroges' bleak situation in the first century BCE, assailed by debt, expropriation, and abuses of power, began to turn, perhaps ironically, when war came to their doorstep. Gaius Julius Caesar's accession as proconsular governor of Gallia Transalpina in 58BCE saw him launching into war with Gallic peoples north of the province. On two occasions during the resulting years of campaigning, Caesar framed himself as a defender of the Allobroges against attackers from further afield. In the first, a Roman garrison is said to have protected the Allobrogan town of Genava (modern Geneva) from the depredations of the migrating Helvetii (Caes. BG 1.7–8).²⁸ In the second, in 52BCE, representatives of the Arvernian leader Vercingetorix made overtures to the Allobroges to join the growing rebellion against the occupying Roman forces across Gaul, only to be rejected, seemingly true to form, prompting the rebels to attempt an assault on the province before Caesar's forces repulsed them (Caes. BG 7.64–5).

Caesar's commentaries also relate multiple instances wherein he took members of the Allobrogan aristocracy into his service. One of these was Gaius Valerius Procillus, the son of Caburus, a young man described as preeminent among the Gauls of the province and a particular friend of Caesar himself (Caes. BG 1.19). In 58BCE, he first acted as Caesar's interpreter for the concilium of all Gauls he convened after the defeat of the Helvetii, and then as a picked envoy/spy to the Germanic warlord Ariovistus (Caes. BG 1.53). This latter venture saw him briefly imprisoned, abused, and threatened with a fate of human sacrifice, before his fortuitous rescue by Roman forces. In his account of the civil war against Pompey c.49–7BCE, Caesar describes how the Allobrogan brothers, Egos and Roucillos, sons of Adbucillos, had served him with distinction for several years as cavalry

27 Lewuillon (1975) 542–3. Lewuillon (2002) 244–5. Collis (2007) 526. Quintela (2012) 455–9. Arbabe (2017) 13.

28 It should be noted that the veracity of Caesar's claims on this specific point are highly contested, as they align poorly with both the archaeological remains of the sites in question and with the author's own description of events surrounding the matter elsewhere in the text. For discussion of these issues see Delbrück (1975) 429–70 and Thorne (2007) 32.

officers. In exchange for their service and loyalty, he had rewarded their formerly impoverished family with gifts of landed estates, very possibly some of the same confiscated by Fonteius decades ago, and money (Caes. BC 3.59). Despite this largesse, however, during the Siege of Dyrrachium the brothers were discovered to be embezzling from their troops' wages and defected to the Pompeian side to avoid Caesar's wrath. They apparently met their fate on the field at Pharsalus (Caes. BC 3.84.).

Although Caesar did not strictly take the place of the Fabians as ancestral patron to the Allobrogan nation as a whole, developing patronal relations with many of their aristocrats during his unusually long and influential tenure as provincial governor, and use of the loyalties he had cultivated in his turn to civil war afterwards, he radically departed from the pre-established norms of provincial government and its impact on the local population.²⁹ We have no record of what, other than a grant of citizenship, Valerius Flaccus gave his clients in Gallia Transalpina before returning to Rome. If we can correctly interpret Caesar's actions as that he did not merely bestow favours and citizenship upon a handful of elites but also land and cash to a broad array of the Allobrogan nobility as a whole, the impact of his contributions were on a different order of magnitude.³⁰

Their crisis alleviated and their status elevated by Caesar's aid, the Allobroges continued to prosper under his successors. During the closing decades of the first century BCE and after the turn of the millennium, the Allobrogan power centre of Vianna (modern Vienne) developed into a large and wealthy Gallo-Roman city, only dwarfed in the region by Lugdunum (modern Lyons) to the north as the new hub of Roman Gaul and the Mediterranean gateway port of Arelate (modern Arles) to the south. Under its Julio-Claudian patronage the city received the status of *colonia*, granting it legal parity with Rome itself (Plin. HN. 3.4.36). The newly renamed province of Gallia Narbonensis was one of the provinces returned to the control of the Senate in 20BCE, and thus still under the jurisdiction of proconsular or propraetorian governors rather than imperial appointees, but from then on the chief settlement of the Allobroges would no longer be subject to their whims without legal recourse (Dio. Cass. 54.4.1).³¹

Writing in the early first century CE, the Greek geographer Strabo remarks on how the Allobroges, once a nation of great and enthusiastic warriors, had

29 Whereas the normal term for a propraetorian or proconsular provincial governor in the Late Republican era was 1–3 years, Caesar's manoeuvring (with the initial aid of his triumviral partners) and engagement in civil war had allowed him to remain controlling governor of both Gallic provinces for nearly 11 years in total (58–47BCE).

30 For evidence of Caesar's good relations with the Allobroges see Drinkwater (1983) 17–18; Rivet (1988) 75; and Lucas (2018) 37–8.

31 Richardson (2012) 115.

embraced peace and become farmers under Roman rule (Strab. 4.1.11). In 35CE, Decimus Valerius Asiaticus, an Allobrogan, presumably a descendant of Valerius Caburus, and a native of Vianna, became the first Gaul to hold a Roman consulship (Tac. Ann. 11.2, CIL 14, 04240). Under the Principate a member of the nation Cicero had once used his rhetoric to denigrate and urged his audience to banish from city, would now walk its streets as a leader of the Senate. Similarly, the epigraphic record of settlement speaks to the existence of local Julii dynasties, originally enfranchised either by Caesar or Augustus, as part of the fabric of the community as they were in many parts of early Roman Gaul (Tac. Hist. 3.35).³²

The case study of the Allobroges and their relations with provincial government under the Late Republic and early Principate through the lens of patron/client relations complicates a narrative in which assimilation of local elites was the simple and effective cornerstone upon which Roman Imperialism was built.³³ The enfranchisement of loyal local elites with citizenship and engagement in with patronage from elite Roman society was not a straightforward recipe for securing the pacification and support of conquered peoples. Furthermore, as we have seen, the shifting power structures of the senatorial oligarchy meant that even strategically seeking the patronage of a great scion from noble house, such as Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus, could fail to pay off in the long run if their dynasty did not maintain a consistently high level of prestige. Since they could not rely on their 'national' patron to sway things in their favour at Rome, and other senatorial patrons may not take on either enough of or the right clients from among their community to make a meaningful difference, the only options left to them were either to send envoys to appeal directly to the Senate or to foment armed rebellion against Roman rule, neither of which were likely to succeed. What proved far more crucial to the long-term stabilisation of the Allobroges' relationship with Rome was the institution of a system that allowed patrons and their dynastic successors to avoid the pitfalls and vagaries of the *cursus honorum*: the imperial monarchy. As long as they could maintain a cordial relationship with a presiding triumvir/dictator/princeps, the Allobroges and other provincial subject populations would no longer be forced to address Roman abuses by either fruitlessly appealing to an indifferent Senate or hopelessly inciting revolt.

32 Drinkwater (1978) 818–25. Hostein (2010) 52–3.

33 For examples of this view, at least in a general sense, see Ando (2000) 59, and Eckstein (2006) 34.

Bibliography

- Ando C. (2000) *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley: UC Press).
- Arbabe E. (2017) *La Politique des Gaulois: vie politique et institutions en Gaule Chevelue (IIe siècle avant notre ère-70)* (Paris: Errance).
- Barrandon N. and Hurllet F. (2009) “Les gouverneurs et l’Occident romain (IIe siècle av. J-C. – IIe siècle ap. J-C.)”, in Hurllet F. (ed.) *Rome et l’Occident romain (IIe siècle av. J-C. – IIe siècle ap. J-C.): Gouverner l’Empire* (Rennes: PUR), 35–76.
- Barton C.A. (2007) “The Price of Peace in Ancient Rome”, in Raafaub, K.A. (ed.) *War and Peace in the Ancient World* (Oxford: Wiley), 245–56.
- Blösel W. (2016) “Provincial Commands and Money in the Late Roman Republic”, in Beck H. Jehne M. and Serrati J. (eds.) *Money and Power in the Roman Republic* (Brussels: Latomus), 68–81.
- Broughton T.R.S. (1951) *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic Vol. II* (New York: American Philological Association).
- Burton P.J. (2009) “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic: A Constructivist Approach” *The International History Review* 31, 237–52.
- Burton P.J. (2016) “Deditio”, in Phang S.E. Spence I. Kelly D. and Londey P. (eds.) *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia Vol. II* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO), 857–8.
- Christol M. (2015) “Foreign Clientelae, la Gaule méridionale: un modèle d’intégration?” in Jehne M. and Polo F.P. (eds.) *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: a reconsideration* (Stuttgart: Historia), 153–63.
- Collis J. (2007) “The Polities of Gaul, Britain, and Ireland in the Late Iron Age”, in Haselgrove C. and Moore T. (eds.) *The Later Iron Age in Britain and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxbow), 523–7.
- D’Arms J.H. (1986) *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge MA: HUP).
- Delbrück H. (1975) *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History Vol. I – Antiquity* (trans. Renfroe W.J., Westpoint/London: Greenwood).
- Deniaux E. (2006) “Patronage” (tr. Morstein-Marx R. and Martz R.), in Rosenstein N. and Morstein-Marx R. (eds.) *A Companion to the Roman Republic* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), 401–20.
- Dimitrova M. (2018) *Julius Caesar’s Self-Created Image and its Dramatic Afterlife* (London: Bloomsbury Academic).
- Drinkwater J.F. (1978) “The Rise and Fall of the Gallic Iulii: Aspects of the Development of the Aristocracy of the Three Gauls under the Early Empire” *Latomus* 37, 817–50.
- Drinkwater J.F. (1983) *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces 58BC-AD260* (London/Canberra: Croom Helm).

- Dyson S.L. (1985) *The Creation of the Roman Frontier* (Princeton: PUP).
- Ebel C. (1976) *Transalpine Gaul: the Emergence of a Roman Province* (Leiden: Brill).
- Eckstein A.M. (2006) *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley: UC Press).
- Eckstein A.M. (2009) "Ancient 'International Law', the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Unconditional Surrender to Rome: A Realist View" *The International History Review* 31, 253–67.
- Fentress E. (2019) "The Domitii Ahenobarbi and Tribal Slaving in Gaul", in Modolo M. Pallecchi S. Volpe G. and Zanini E. (eds.) *Una Lezione di Archaeologia Globale: Studi in onore di Daniele Manacorda* (Bari: Edipuglia), 149–55.
- Fitzpatrick A. (1985) "The Distribution of Dressel 1 Amphorae in North-West Europe" *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 4, 305–40.
- Hopkins K. (1980) "Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200BC-AD400)" *JRS* 70, 101–25.
- Hostein A. (2010) "D'Époredirix à Iulius Calenus, du chef éduen au chevalier romain (Ier s. av. – Ier s. ap. J-C.)", in Chausson F. (ed.) *Occidents romains: sénateurs, chevaliers, militaires et notables dans les provinces d'occident* (Paris: Errance), 49–80.
- Kirbihler F. (2009) "Les lois provinciaux en Occident: état de la question", in Hurlet F. (ed.) *Rome et l'Occident romain (Ile siècle av. J-C. – Ile siècle ap. J-C.): Gouverner l'Empire* (Rennes: PUR), 25–34.
- Leuwillon S. (1975) "Histoire, Société et Lutte des Classes en Gaule: une féodalité à la fin de la république et au début de l'empire", in Temporini H. and Hausel W. (eds.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Rom im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung Vol. II* (Berlin: De Gruyter), 428–583.
- Leuwillon S. (2002) "Le Syndrome du Vergobret: à propos de quelques magistratures gauloises", in Guichard V. and Perrin F. (eds.) *L'Aristocratie Celtique à la fin de l'âge du fer (du IIe siècle avant J-C. au Ier siècle après J-C.)* (Mont Beauvray: Bibracte), 243–58.
- Lintott A. (2008) *Cicero as Evidence: A Historian's Companion* (Oxford: OUP).
- Lucas G. (2002) "Les Allobroges dans les sources littéraires", in Jospin J-P. (ed.) *Les Allobroges. Gaulois et Romains du Rhône aux Alpes* (Gollion: Infolio), 26–9.
- Lucas G. (2018) *Viennes dans les textes Grecs et Latins: chroniques littéraires sur l'histoire de la cité des Allobroges à la fin du Ve siècle de notre ère* (Lyons: Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée).
- Mauné S. (2000) "La Question des Premières Installations Rurales Italiennes en Gaule Transalpine (fin du IIe s.-milieu Ier s. avant J-C.)" *Gallia* 57, 231–60.
- Pagán V.E. (2004) *Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History* (Austin: UT Press).
- Quintela M.G. (2012) "Institution et Conflit dans la Politique des Sociétés Celtiques", in Ménard H. Sauzeau P. and Thomas J.F. (eds.) *La Pomme d'Éris: Le Conflit et sa Représentation dans l'Antiquité* (Montpellier: Presses Universitaires de la Méditerranée), 445–62.

- Rawlings L. (2009) "Caesar's Portrayal of the Gauls as Warriors", in Welch K. and Powell A. (eds.) *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales), 171–92.
- Richardson J.S. (2012) *Augustan Rome 44BC to AD14: The Restoration of the Republic and the Establishment of the Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Riggsby A.M. (2006) *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin: UT Press).
- Rivet A.L.F. (1988) *Gallia Narbonensis: Southern France in Roman Times* (London: Batsford).
- Roselaar S.T. (2010) *Public Land in the Roman Republic: A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy 396-89BC* (Oxford: OUP).
- Rosenstein N. (2012) *Rome and the Mediterranean 290 to 146BC: The Imperial Republic* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Thollard P. (2009) *La Gaule selon Strabon: du texte à l'archéologie* (Aix-en-Provence: Errance).
- Thorne J. (2007) "The Chronology of the Campaign against the Helvetii: A Clue to Caesar's Intentions" *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 56, 27–36.
- Vasaly A. (1993) *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory* (Berkeley: UC Press).
- Von Reden S. (2012) "Money and Finance", in Scheidel W. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy* (Cambridge: CUP), 266–86.